Action, Word and Afterthought. Wittgenstein, Apel and the Metaintentional Logic of the Humanities

      Аннотация: Part A of this essay deals with the logic of the humanities. These disciplines are, unlike the natural sciences, ‘meta’-intentional. Interpretations, rule-following, rationality and knowledge, primarily attributed to scientists/ the members of the community of investigators, must in social science also be acknowledged at the level of the objects investigated. In these sciences one has to do with sentences that describe intentional relations-to-world; sentences of the form ‘indirect speech’, belief-sentences etc. An objective of A is to direct attention to Ludwig Wittgenstein's philosophy – in particular his "Investigations" – as a historically important but insufficiently estimated contribution to clarification of the logical form of the social sciences. It also includes comments against "methodic solipsism", an implicit and wide-spread premise in philosophy of science generally. Part B has the character of first philosophy, focussing on Kant and Wittgenstein and the distinction between (persons') intentions and (words') intensions. As indicative mottos for this part have been chosen: "In the beginning was the Word" (John 1.1) and "In the beginning was the Act" (Goethe, Faust).

Ключевые слова: Humanities, belief sentences, linguistic-pragmatic turn, the double performative-propositional double structure of speech, transcendental 'I'