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Should Conglomerate Mergers be Per Se Legal?. A Critical Analysis
В наличии
Местонахождение: Алматы | Состояние экземпляра: новый |
Бумажная
версия
версия
Автор: George P. Kyprianides
ISBN: 9783659608704
Год издания: 2015
Формат книги: 60×90/16 (145×215 мм)
Количество страниц: 84
Издательство: LAP LAMBERT Academic Publishing
Цена: 22125 тг
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Аннотация: This book scrutinises conglomerate mergers and how they may impede competition in the market place. The European Commission's seven generic criteria used in the assessment of conglomerate mergers and the strategies that a conglomerate entity may employ to impede competition are of particular importance in demonstrating the dangers that may ensue. Other issues which are closely scrutinised are the Traditional Economic view and its efficiencies. The discussion naturally leads to whether the Commission’s decisions are in accord with the economic view, as seen in the case of Kraft/Cadbury but also with previous cases which the Commission is definitely not proud of such as Tetra/Sidel and GE/Honeywell. The standard of proof, the role of Article 102, and the SIEC test are amidst the issues discussed. Certainly the Commission's policy is competent in dealing with a conglomerate entity. Nevertheless, it can be improved further by considering the criticisms and proposals offered in this book. At the same time, the EU Courts should 'bite the bullet' and provide more legal certainty in the market.
Ключевые слова: market share, Court of First Instance, Conglomerate mergers, European Commission, predatory pricing, SIEC, Non-Horizontal Mergers, ECMR, tying; bundling, portfolio power, full-line forcing, co-ordinated effects