Поиск по каталогу |
(строгое соответствие)
|
- Профессиональная
- Научно-популярная
- Художественная
- Публицистика
- Детская
- Искусство
- Хобби, семья, дом
- Спорт
- Путеводители
- Блокноты, тетради, открытки
An Expected Utility Approach to Energy Security in Eurasia. Game theoretic analysis of international bargaining on Iran's nuclear program, South Ossetia and Nagorno Karabakh
В наличии
Местонахождение: Алматы | Состояние экземпляра: новый |
Бумажная
версия
версия
Автор: ?zg?r ?zdamar
ISBN: 9786202304856
Год издания: 2017
Формат книги: 60×90/16 (145×215 мм)
Количество страниц: 292
Издательство: Scholars' Press
Цена: 58069 тг
Положить в корзину
Способы доставки в город Алматы * комплектация (срок до отгрузки) не более 2 рабочих дней |
Самовывоз из города Алматы (пункты самовывоза партнёра CDEK) |
Курьерская доставка CDEK из города Москва |
Доставка Почтой России из города Москва |
Аннотация: This manuscript presents forecasts made to predict evolution of regional conflicts with potential to threaten world energy security via using a dynamic expected utility model with coercion. Securing energy resources has become a key aspect of foreign policy-making since the 1970s. States have used military and economic foreign policy tools to secure the supply of energy to their domestic markets. With the fall of the USSR in 1991, political and economic competition for penetration into energy-rich regions spread through Eurasia. Inspired from the nineteenth century term to describe Russian-British rivalry in the region, the current rivalry among great powers and their allies is called the “New Great Game”. This project analyzes three political conflicts that are shaped by such rivalry that can threaten global energy security. Empirical results from the expected utility model (Bueno de Mesquita 1985) suggest the rivalry among the Western (i.e.EU, US) and Eastern (i.e. Russia, China) powers about the Iranian nuclear program, Nagorno-Karabakh and South Ossetia conflicts is likely to continue and shows some Cold War characteristics.
Ключевые слова: conflict, game theory, Russia, energy security, Eurasia, expected utility model, dynamic median voter model with coercion, the EU, the US