The win-win-win papakonstantinidis model: towards a new equilibrium?.

      Аннотация: The book deals with social welfare, as the limit of the Sensitization Process, especially focused on social welfare based on the incompatibilities of other theorems, especially the Impossibility Theorem (Kenneth Arrow,1951, “Non-Cooperative Game” Theory and the bargaining problem, thus synthesizing e a new proposal of bargaining behavior It also provides the scientist and research community with a new methodological tool useful not only in the political conflict resolution but also for measurement the social welfare, in terms of deviation from the w-w-w equilibrium point A new approach on “social bargain behavior” with more grades of ‘action-reaction’ freedom is examined. The same competitive market rules, could provide humanity by a quite different behavior choice, toward the absolute cooperation, the upper limit of the sensitization process-sequence, for producing “social welfare results” especially in LDC, by peer-pressure operation

Ключевые слова: “win - win- win”, Welfare Economics, the Impossibility Theorem (Arrow) the Incompleteness Theorem (G?del) Pareto Efficiency, Nash equilibrium