A Proposed Mechanism for the Iranian Model of Kidney Donation. A Comparison of the Iranian and Roth’s Models

      Аннотация: This book illustrates one of the uses of the design mechanism as: One of the most critical market duties is to ensure coordination between the supplier and demander. When the market fails to fulfill this duty efficiently, it either does not form or fail and disintegrate. This is because the number of market participants is either too large or too small, and/or the market experiences conditions where the participants scarcely give voice to their priorities with ease and confidence, contends that the fundamental challenge in market design is that we sufficiently understand complex markets and develop our abilities to the point where we can reconstruct or redesign them upon their failure and/or use market-like mechanisms. Some markets are so complex that people cannot select what they need despite their willingness and ability to pay for it. That is, price mechanism and automatic adjustment do not provide the market with balance although this does not imply the impossibility of market formation. Market design theory and matching theory seek to provide a stage where suppliers and demanders can meet without using the traditional market mechanism (price mechanism).

Ключевые слова: market design, matching theory, Kidney Exchange Model, Iranian Model of Kidney Donation, Assignment Algorithm